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Abstract
This paper studies the connection between a class of mean-field games and a social welfare optimization problem. We consider
a mean-field game in function spaces with a large population of agents, and each agent seeks to minimize an individual cost
function. The cost functions of different agents are coupled through a mean-field term that depends on the mean of the
population states. We show that although the mean-field game is not a potential game, under some mild condition the -Nash
equilibrium of the mean-field game coincides with the optimal solution to a social welfare optimization problem, and this is
true even when the individual cost functions are non-convex. The connection enables us to evaluate and promote the efficiency
of the mean-field equilibrium. In addition, it also leads to several important implications on the existence, uniqueness, and
computation of the mean-field equilibrium. Numerical results are presented to validate the solution, and examples are provided
to show the applicability of the proposed approach.
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1 Introduction
Mean-field games study the interactions among a large
population of strategic agents, whose decision making is
coupled through a mean-field term that depends on the
statistical information of the overall population [1], [2],
[3], [4], [5]. When the population size is large, each in-
dividual agent has a negligible impact on the mean-field
term. This enables characterizing the game equilibrium
via the interactions between the agent and the mean-
field, instead of focusing on detailed interactions among
all the agents. This idea was originally formalized in a
series of seminal papers by Lasry and Lions [1], [2] and
by Huang et al. [4], [6], where the mean-field equilibrium
was characterized as the solution to an equation system
that couples a backward Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion and a forward Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation.
These seminal results attracted considerable research ef-
fort on various aspects of mean-field games. For instance,
many works focused on the existence [6], [7], uniqueness
[1], [8], and computation [9], [10], [11] of the mean-field
equilibrium. For a more comprehensive review, please re-
fer to [12] and [13]. Another strand of works extended
the mean-field game model to more general settings such
as heterogeneous agents [4], major-minor player model
1 This work was supported in part by the National Science
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[14], [15], [16], extended mean-field games [17], etc. Fur-
thermore, mean-field games also find abundant applica-
tions in economics [18], [19], crowd and population dy-
namics [20], demand response [21], [22], [23], networking
[24], coupled oscillators [25], to name a few.
For many applications, it is important to analyze and
quantify the efficiency of the mean-field equilibrium as
compared to some socially optimal solutions. Along this
line, the authors in [26] and [27] showed that the co-
ordinator can design a mean-field game with an equi-
librium that asymptotically achieves social optima as
the population size goes to infinity. This result is true
only when each agent in the game is cooperative. In the
non-cooperative game setting, a recent work [28] showed
that the Nash equilibrium of an electric vehicle charging
game is socially optimal as the number of agents tends
to infinity, under the assumption that the underlying
game is a potential game. However, when the mean-field
game is non-cooperative and does not admit a potential
function, the mean-field equilibrium is shown to be in-
efficient in general. For instance, [29] employed a varia-
tional approach to study the efficiency loss of mean-field
equilibria for a synchronization game among oscillators.
In [30], a mean-field congestion game was formulated,
and numerical results were presented to show that the
mean-field equilibrium is inefficient in general. In addi-
tion, [31] derived conditions under which the mean-filed
equilibrium is efficient. However, since these conditions
are quite restrictive. Instead of indicating the efficiency
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of the mean-field equilibrium, they are more useful in
evaluating what happens in an inefficient equilibrium.
This paper studies the connection between mean-field
games and social welfare optimization problems. We con-
sider a class of mean-field games in vector spaces (po-
tentially infinite-dimensional) with a large population of
non-cooperative agents. Each agent seeks to minimize
a cost functional. It couples the costs of other agents
through a mean-field term that depends on the average
of the population states. The key contribution of the pa-
per lies in establishing the connection between the mean-
field game and a modified social welfare optimization
problem. This connection not only enables us to evaluate
the promote the efficiency of the mean-field equilibrium,
but also has several important implications on the ex-
istence, uniqueness, and computation of the mean-field
equilibrium. These contributions are summarized as fol-
lows:
• First, we show that under some mild conditions, the
mean-field equilibrium is efficient with respect to a
modified social welfare optimization problem. This is
true even when the individual costs and action spaces
are non-convex. The connection enables us to evaluate
and promote the efficiency of the mean-field equilib-
rium: given a mean-field game, we can construct the
modified social welfare optimization problem to eval-
uate the efficiency of the equilibrium; given a social
cost function, we can design the mean-field game to
provide a socially optimal mean-field equilibrium.
• Second, we show that the mean-field equilibrium ex-
ists if the associated social welfare optimization prob-
lem has strong duality. In addition, the other direction
also holds under an additional monotonicity condition
on the mean-field coupling term. Different from many
existing works [1], [8], [32], [33], we obtain necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of the mean-
field equilibrium. This is stronger than the results in
the existing literature.
• Third, we show that the mean-field equilibrium is
unique if the corresponding social welfare optimiza-
tion problem is strictly convex. This recovers the
results of some works on the uniqueness of the mean-
field equilibrium [1], [32], providing a novel interpre-
tation of these results.
• Fourth, our result implies that computing the mean-
field equilibrium is equivalent to solving a social wel-
fare optimization problem. When this optimization
problem is convex, various efficient algorithms can be
employed to compute the mean-field equilibrium. Ac-
cording to our results, some existing methods on com-
puting the mean-field equilibrium [9], [23] can be in-
terpreted as certain primal-dual algorithms in solving
the associated social welfare optimization problem. To
improve these algorithms, we provide an example of
using the alternating direction method of multipliers
[34] to compute the mean-field equilibrium. Simula-
tion result shows that the proposed algorithm con-
verges faster than the operator-based method.
• Fifth, we discuss the differences between the modified
social welfare and the potential function in potential
games. We show that in general, the mean-field game
considered in this paper is not a potential game. In
this case, the proposed method is the only way to con-
nect the mean-field game to an optimization problem.
Under additional assumptions(e.g., mean-field term is
linear), the mean-field game may reduce to a potential
game. In this case, both the social welfare optimization
and the potential function minimization are connected
to the mean-field game. We show that compared to
the potential function method, the social welfare opti-
mization (a) provides a relaxed solution concept, (b)
enables decentralized implementation and enjoys bet-
ter scalability.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The mean-field
game is formulated in Section II. The game equilibrium
is characterized by a set of coupled equations in Section
III. The connection between the mean-field equations
and the social welfare optimization problem is studied in
Section IV. Section V discusses the implications on the
existence, uniqueness and computation of the mean-field
equilibrium. Section VI provides numerical results and
examples.
2 Mean-Field Games in Function Spaces
This section formulates the class of mean-field games to
be studied in this paper. Different from many existing
works, we will describe the mean-field games in vector
spaces (possibly infinite-dimensional). We show that our
formulation includes many important classes of mean-
field games as special cases [4], [9], [23], [35]. The vector
space formulation allows us to more directly focus on
aspects and challenges related to strategic interactions
among the agents, instead of worrying about specific de-
tails and unnecessary technical conditions on system dy-
namics.
2.1 The Mean-Field Game
We consider a general mean-field game in a vector space
among N agents. Each agent i is associated with a state
variable xi, a control input ui and a noise input pii. The
control input ui takes value in Ui ⊆ U , where U is an
arbitrary vector space. The noise input pii is a random
element in the measurable spaces Πi with the underlying
probability space (Ω,F , P ). The state of each agent is
determined by the control and noise according to the
following mapping fi : Ui ×Πi → X :
xi = fi(ui, pii), ui ∈ Ui, (1)
where xi is a random element that takes value in the
space X . When xi and ui are time-domain trajectories,
the system dynamics are implicitly captured by (1). To
ensure that xi is well-defined, we impose the following
assumption on fi(ui, pii):
Assumption 1 For each ui ∈ Ui, fi(ui, pii(·)) : Ω→ X
is a measurable mapping with respect to F/Z, where Z
is a σ-algebra on X ,
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Under Assumption 1, xi : Ω→ X is a measurable map-
ping with respect to F/Z. Therefore, xi is a well-defined
random element that takes value in X , with the expec-
tation defined as the Bochner integral.
On the space X , we define an inner product and a norm.
The inner product is denoted as x · y for x, y ∈ X , and
the norm is defined as ||x|| = √x · x. We assume that X
is complete.
Assumption 2 X is a Hilbert space.
The completeness of X is mainly used to induce a special
form of duality theory in vector spaces. More elabora-
tions can be found in Remark 4.
Throughout the paper, we assume that xi and xj are
independent. In addition, we assume the state xi has
bounded second moment, i.e., there exists C ≥ 0 such
thatE||xi||2 ≤ C for all i = 1, . . . , N . In this case, the ad-
missible control set can be defined as U¯i = {ui ∈ Ui|xi =
fi(ui, pii),E||xi||2 ≤ C, xi ∈ Xi}, whereXi represents the
local constraint on xi, and Xi ⊆ X .
For each agent i, there is a cost function on the system
state and control input. The costs of different agents are
coupled through a mean-field term that depends on the
average of the population state. We write it as follows:
Ji(xi, ui, x¯) = E (Vi(xi, ui) + F (x¯) · xi +G(x¯)) , (2)
where x¯ ∈ X is the average of the population state, i.e.,
x¯ , 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi, F : X → X is the mean-field coupling
term, and G : X → R is the cost associated with the
mean-field term. The following conditions are imposed
on Ji.
Assumption 3 (i) F (·) is globally Lipschitz continu-
ous on X with constant L , (ii) G(·) is Fre´chet differ-
entiable on X , and the gradient of G(·) at 0 is bounded,
i.e., ||∇G(0)|| < ∞. (iii) the gradient of G(·) is glob-
ally Lipschitz continuous on X with constant β, i.e.,
||∇G(x)−∇G(y)|| ≤ β||x− y||, ∀x, y ∈ X .
The mean-field game considered in this paper is formu-
lated as follows:
min
ui
E (Vi(xi, ui) + F (x¯) · xi +G(x¯)) (3a)
s.t. xi = fi(ui, pii), ui ∈ U¯i, (3b)
where x¯ , 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi. As (3) is defined in vector spaces,
it provides a unifying framework that incorporates a
large body of literature. It includes both discrete-time
[9], [23] and continuous-time system [4] as special cases,
and addresses both deterministic and stochastic cases.
In the cost function (3), the inner product term F (x¯) ·xi
can be either interpreted as the price multiplied by quan-
tity [10], [36], [37] or part of the quadratic penalty of the
deviation of the system state from the population mean
[4], [26]. This structure is very common in the literature.
We provide a few examples in the next subsection.
Remark 1 The proposed mean-field game has finite
number of agents. This is different from many classic
works [1], [6], where a continuum model is considered.
It is inspired by the continuum particle model in fluid
dynamics. However, decision making problems with a
continuum of decision-makers are uncommon in engi-
neering applications. In common cases, the continuum
model is often used as an approximation of some finite
system [38]. For such system, our finite model is directly
applicable and naturally incorporates the heterogeneity
of the agents.
2.2 Examples
The mean-field game (3) captures a large class of im-
portant problems. In this subsection, we present three
examples:
2.2.1 Discrete-time deterministic game
First, consider a deterministic mean-field game in
discrete-time [9]. The cost function of the game is as
follows:
min
xi
||xi||2Q + ||x− x¯||2∆ + 2(Ax¯+ a)Txi (4)
where xi ∈ RT is the system state, x¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi is
the average state, ||xi||2Q stands for xTi Qxi, A ∈ RT×T ,
and Q and ∆ are symmetric positive definite matrices of
appropriate dimensions. Although (4) is formulated in
the static form, it captures a class of finite-dimensional
linear quadratic games, which can be transformed to (4)
by plugging the linear dynamics in the cost function [9].
Next, we show that the above game problem can be for-
mulated as (3). Note that in (3), the state space and the
control space are both RT , and xi = ui, i.e., fi is the
identity function. If we expand the norm and combine
similar terms in (4), we can transform (4) to the follow-
ing form:
min
xi
xTi (Q+∆)xi+2a
Txi+2x¯
T (A−∆)xi+ x¯T∆x¯ (5)
Comparing (5) to (3), we have Vi(xi, ui) = x
T
i (Q +
∆)xi + 2a
Txi, F (x¯) = 2(A − ∆)x¯, and G(x¯) = x¯T∆x¯.
It is easy to verify that the game problem (5) satisfies
Assumption 1-3. Therefore, (5) is a special case of the
proposed mean-field game (3).
2.2.2 Continuous-time stochastic game
The second example is a linear quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) game considered in Section II-A of [4]:
min
{ui(t),t≥0}
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
(xi(t)− v(t))2 + rui(t)2
]
dt (6)
s.t.
{
dxi(t) = ui(t)dt+ σidpii(t)
xi(t) ∈ R, ui(t) ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N, (7)
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where xi(t) and ui(t) denote the state and control for
the ith agent at time t, pii(t) is a standard scalar Brow-
nian motion, v(t) , b− c 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t) is the mean-field
term, and ρ, r, b, c > 0 are real constants. It is assumed
that the Brownian motions pii = {pii(t), t ≥ 0} and
pij = {pij(t), t ≥ 0} are independent for any i 6= j. Let
ui = {ui(t), t ≥ 0}. The authors in [4] defined the admis-
sible control set as U¯i = {ui|ui(t) is adapted to the σ −
algebra σ(xi(0), pii(s), s ≤ t), and E
∫∞
0
e−ρt[xi(t)2 +
ui(t)
2]dt < ∞}. Let x = {x(t) ∈ R, t ≥ 0}, then the
state space X is X = {x| ∫
[0,∞) e
−ρt|x(t)|2dt <∞}.
Next, we show that problem (6) is a special case of the
mean-field game (3). To this end, we transform (6) to
the form of (3), and verify Assumption 1- Assumption 3.
First, the stochastic differential equation (7) can be
solved explicitly. The solution is as follows:
xi(t) =
∫ t
0
ui(s)ds+ σi
∫ t
0
dpii(s). (8)
It indicates that xi is determined by {ui(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t},
thus fi can be defined according to (8). Clearly, xi(t) is
well-defined, and Assumption 1 holds.
Second, for any x ∈ X and y ∈ X , we define their inner
product as
x · y =
∫
[0,∞)
e−ρtx(t)y(t)dt, (9)
and define the norm as ||x|| = √x · x. Under this norm,
we can show that X is complete, thus Assumption 2 is
satisfied.
Lemma 1 The state space X relative to the mean-field
game (6) is a Hilbert space.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Third, under the inner product (9), the objective func-
tion of the problem (6) can be transformed to the form
of (3):
E (Vi(xi, ui) + F (x¯) · xi +G(x¯)) , (10)
where Vi(xi, ui) = ||xi||2 +
∫∞
0
e−ρtrui(t)2dt, F (x¯) =
2cx¯ − 2bI, G(x¯) = ||cx¯ − bI||2, and I denotes the unit
vector in X . Since F (x¯) = 2cx¯−2b and ∇G(x¯) = 2(cx¯−
bI) are globally Lipschitz continuous, Assumption 3 is
satisfied. Therefore, (6) is a special case of the mean-field
game (3).
Remark 2 In this example, the admissible control space
is the set of control strategies adapted to the filtration
σ(xi(0), pii(s), s ≤ t). This represents the closed-loop per-
fect state information structure [39], i.e. ui(t) depends
on {xi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. We comment that the information
structure of the mean-field game (3) can be more general
than closed-loop perfect state information structure. For
instance, if U¯i only contains the control strategies that de-
pend on the initial state xi(0), it represents the open-loop
information structure. If each ui in U¯i satisfies that ui(t)
depends on xi(t), it corresponds to the close-loop feedback
information structure. Such generalization is possible as
long as the admissible control space U¯i remains a vector
space.
2.2.3 Network Routing Games
The third example concerns a splittable routing game
[40], [41] on a network G = (V, E), where V is the set
of vertices and E is the set of edges. Assume there are
N players. Each of them (say, the ith agent) tries to
allocate traffic ri to the paths from an origin si ∈ V to a
destination ti ∈ V. This is done by choosing the flow f (i)p
such that
∑
p∈Pi f
(i)
p = ri, where Pi is the set of paths
from si to ti, and f
(i)
p is the rate allocated to path p.
Given f
(i)
p , the total flow on a path, denoted as fp, is the
sum of all allocations to this path, i.e., fp =
∑N
i=1 f
(i)
p .
The flow on each edge e ∈ E is the total flow of all paths
occupying this edge, i.e., fe =
∑
p∈Pi:e∈p fp.
Each edge e ∈ E of the network has a congestion cost
that depends on the flow fe. Denote this cost as ce(fe),
and assume it to be increasing, convex and continuously
differentiable. The cost of each player is as follow:
Ji(f) =
∑
e∈p,p∈Pi
ce(fe)f
(i)
p . (11)
Interestingly, the routing game (11) is a special case of
the proposed mean-field game (2). To see this, refor-
mulate the decision of each agent as the vector ui =
{f (i)e , e ∈ E}, where f (i)e = ∑p∈Pi:e∈p f (i)p is the rate
agent i allocated to edge e. Clearly, fe =
∑N
i=1 f
(i)
e . Let
F (f) = {Fe(f), e ∈ E} be a vector-valued function, and
each coordinate of F (f) is Fe(f) = ce(fe). Using this
notation, the routing game (11) can be transformed to
the following form:
Ji(u) = F (Nu¯) · ui, (12)
where u¯ =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui. This is a special case of (2) with
Vi = 0 and G = 0. Note that the network imposes
some constraint on the decision ui. These are linear con-
straints, and we neglect them in the presentation.
2.3 Objective of this Paper
The objective of this paper is to study the connection
between the mean-field game (3) and the social welfare
optimization problem. In most of the existing literature,
a natural candidate for the social welfare is simply the
sum of individual utilities. Unfortunately, it is shown
that under this social welfare, the mean-field equilibrium
is in general not efficient [30], and research effort has
largely focused on characterizing and bounding the gap
between the equilibrium solution and the efficient solu-
tion [4], [29].
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In this paper, instead of characterizing the gap, we ask
the question of whether the mean-field equilibrium can
be efficient for a modified social welfare. In other words,
we would like to construct a social welfare optimization
problem with some modified social welfare such that its
optimal solution coincides with the mean-field equilib-
rium.
In the rest of this paper, we will answer this question in
two steps. First, we focus on the mean-field game (3) and
characterize its equilibrium as the solution to a set of
mean-field equations. Second, we construct a social wel-
fare optimization problem, and show that the solution
to the mean-field equations coincides with the solution
to the social welfare optimization problem.
3 Characterizing The Mean-Field Equilibrium
This section characterizes the equilibrium of the mean-
field game (3) with a set of equations.
There are several solution concepts for the game equilib-
rium, such as Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium, dominant strategy equilibrium, among others. In
mean-field games, we usually relax the Nash equilibrium
solution concept by assuming that each agent is indiffer-
ent to an arbitrarily small change . This solution con-
cept is referred to as the -Nash equilibrium, formally
defined as follows:
Definition 1 (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N ) is an -Nash equilibrium of
the game (3) if the following inequality holds
Ji(u
∗
i , u
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(ui, u∗−i) +  (13)
for all i = 1, . . . , N , and all ui ∈ U¯i, where u−i =
(u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uN ) and Ji(ui, u−i) is the com-
pact notation for (2) after plugging (1) in (2).
At an -Nash equilibrium, each agent can lower his cost
by at most  via deviating from the equilibrium strat-
egy, given that all other players follow the equilibrium
strategy. Therefore, the agents are motivated to play the
equilibrium strategy if they are indifferent to a change
of  in their cost.
To characterize the -Nash equilibrium, we note that the
cost function (2) of the individual agent is only cou-
pled through the mean-field terms F (x¯) and G(x¯). In
the large population case, the impact of the control in-
put for a single agent on the coupling term vanishes as
the population size becomes large. Therefore, we can ap-
proximately treat the mean-field terms F (x¯) and G(x¯)
as given, and each agent then faces an optimal response
problem defined as follows:
µi(y) ∈ arg min
ui
E (Vi(xi, ui) + y · xi) (14)
s.t. xi = fi(ui, pii), ui ∈ U¯i, (15)
where we use a deterministic value y ∈ X to replace
F (x¯). In (14), µi(y) denotes the optimal solution to the
optimal response problem parameterized by y, and G(x¯)
is regarded as a constant in (14) that can be ignored. To
avoid triviality, we impose the following assumption on
(14):
Assumption 4 For any y ∈ X , the optimal response
problem (14) admits at least one solution.
Assumption 4 imposes some mild regularity conditions
on the functional Vi(xi, ui) and the admissible control set
U¯i. For instance, the solution to (14) exists if Vi is con-
tinuous and U¯i is compact. However, the solution to (14)
may also exist beyond these cases. Therefore, to main-
tain generality, we do not present the detailed technical
condition for Assumption 4 to hold. When the optimal
response problem (14) have multiple solutions, µi(y) can
be any one of these solutions.
Based on this approximation, y generates a collection
of agent responses. Ideally, the value y should guide the
individual agents to choose a collection of optimal re-
sponses µi(y) which, in return, collectively generate the
mean-field term F (·) that is close to the approximation
y. This suggests that we use the following equation sys-
tems to characterize the equilibrium of the mean-field
game:
µi(y) ∈ arg min
ui∈U¯i
E (Vi(fi(ui, pii), ui) + y · fi(ui, pii))(16)
xi = fi(µi(y), pii) (17)
y = F
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Exi
)
, (18)
where the mean-field term y induces a collection of re-
sponses that generate y. In the rest of this subsection we
show that the solution to this equation system is an -
Nash equilibrium of the mean-field game (3), and  can
be arbitrarily close to 0 for sufficiently large N . For this
purpose, we first prove the following two lemmas. These
two lemmas are mainly used to set up the stage for the
main result that will be introduced later.
Lemma 2 If there exists C > 0 such that E||xi||2 ≤ C
for all i = 1, . . . , N , and F (·) is globally Lipschitz contin-
uous, then the following relation holds for each agent i:∣∣E(F (x¯) · xi)− F (Ex¯) · Exi∣∣ ≤ , (19)
where x¯ , 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi and 0 <  = O(
1√
N
).
See Appendix B for proof
The other lemma shows that removing the decision of
a single agent does not significantly affect the value of
EG(·):
Lemma 3 Define x¯ , 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi, and let x¯−i ,
1
N
∑
j 6=i xj, where xi denotes the state trajectory corre-
sponding to ui in U¯i, then we have the following relation:∣∣EG(x¯)− EG(x¯−i)∣∣ ≤ , (20)
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and 0 <  = O(
1
N
).
See Appendix C for proof.
Using the results of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we can show
that the solution to the equation system (16)-(18) is an
-Nash equilibrium of the mean-field game (3).
Theorem 1 The solution to the equation system (16)-
(18), if exists, is an N -Nash equilibrium of the mean-
field game (3), and 0 <  = O(
1√
N
).
Proof. For notation convenience, we denote the solu-
tion to the equation system (16)-(18) as u∗i , x
∗
i and y
∗,
where x∗i is the state trajectory corresponding to u
∗
i . Ac-
cording to Definition 1, to prove this theorem, we need
to show that:
E
(
Vi(x
∗
i , u
∗
i ) + F (x¯
∗) · x∗i +G(x¯∗)
)
≤ +
E
(
Vi(xi, ui) + F
(
1
N
xi + x¯
∗
−i
)
· xi +G
(
1
N
xi + x¯
∗
−i
))
(21)
for all ui ∈ U¯i, where  = O( 1√
N
), x¯∗ , 1
N
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i ,
x¯∗−i ,
1
N
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j , and xi is the state trajectory corre-
sponding to ui. Based on Lemma 2, we have
F (Ex¯) · Exi −O( 1√
N
) ≤ E(F (x¯) · xi) ≤
F (Ex¯) · Exi +O( 1√
N
). (22)
Based on Lemma 3, we have
EG(x¯−i)−O( 1√
N
) ≤ EG(x¯) ≤ EG(x¯−i) +O( 1√
N
).
(23)
Apply (22) and (23) to the left-hard side of (21), then
the left-hand side of (21) is upper bounded as follows:
E
(
Vi(x
∗
i ,u
∗
i ) + F (x¯
∗) · x∗i +G(x¯∗)
)
≤ O( 1√
N
)+
EVi(x∗i , u∗i ) + F (Ex¯∗) · Ex∗i + EG(x¯∗−i). (24)
Applying (22) and (23) to the right-hard side of (21), the
right-hand side of (21) is then lower bounded as follows:
E
(
Vi(xi, ui) + F
(
1
N
xi + x¯
∗
−i
)
· xi +G
(
1
N
xi + x¯
∗
−i
))
≥EVi(xi, ui) + F
(
1
N
E
(
xi +
∑
j 6=i
x∗j
)) · Exi+
EG(x¯∗−i)−O(
1√
N
). (25)
Based on (24) and (25), to prove that (21) holds, it suf-
fices to show that
EVi(x∗i ,u∗i ) + F
(
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
x∗i
)
· Ex∗i ≤ O(
1√
N
)+
EVi(xi, ui) + F
(
1
N
E
(
xi +
∑
j 6=i
x∗j
)) · Exi.
(26)
Since ||Exi|| is bounded (see proof for Lemma 2) and F (·)
is Lipschitz continuous with constant L ≥ 0, we have:
∣∣∣∣F( 1N E(xi+∑
j 6=i
x∗j )
)
· Exi − F
(
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
x∗i
)
· Exi
∣∣∣∣ ≤∥∥ 1
N
L(Exi − Ex∗i )
∥∥∥∥Exi∥∥ = O( 1
N
). (27)
Therefore, combining (26) and (27), it suffices to show
that:
EVi(x∗i ,u∗i ) + F
(
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
x∗i
)
· Ex∗i ≤
EVi(xi, ui) + F
(
1
N
E
N∑
i=1
x∗i
)
· Exi +O( 1√
N
).
Note that based on (18), F
(
1
N
E
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i
)
= y∗, which
is equivalent to:
EVi(x∗i , u∗i )+y∗ ·Ex∗i ≤ EVi(xi, ui)+y∗ ·Exi+O(
1√
N
).
This obviously holds based on (16), which completes the
proof.
Theorem 1 indicates that each agent is motivated to fol-
low the equilibrium strategy u∗i as deviating from this
strategy can only decrease the individual cost by a neg-
ligible amount . Furthermore, this  can be arbitrarily
small, if the population size is sufficiently large. Note
that the mean-field equation system (16)-(18) is not the
unique way to characterize the -Nash equilibrium of the
mean-field game (3). The game may have other -Nash
equilibria with different values of . However, in this pa-
per, we only focus on the mean-field equations (16)-(18).
In the rest of this paper, the mean-field equilibrium of
the game (3) always refers to the solution to the mean-
field equations (16)-(18).
Remark 3 It is interesting to discuss the connections
and differences between the mean field equations in our
paper and those in [4]. The deference between these two
results is clear: we consider a set of mean-field equations
for a finite population of agents, while in [4] the authors
used a continuum model to approximate the finite game.
This leads to slightly different forms of the mean-field
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equations: we use empirical mean
1
N
∑N
i=1 Exi to repre-
sent the mean-field, while [4] assumes a distribution over
the agent parameter and uses integral of system state over
this distribution to represent the mean (see (4.8) in [4]).
On the other hand, these two models are connected if we
let N tends to infinity: if the empirical mean converges to
the integral, then the mean-field equations (16)-(18) are
equivalent to those in [4]. However, we emphasize that
this is only true if the empirical mean does converge as
N goes to infinity. Otherwise, the mean-field equations
(16)-(18) are not well-defined as N approaches infinity.
Therefore, we can regard the mean-field equations in [4]
as the limiting case of our equations (16)-(18) under addi-
tional assumptions that guarantee the convergence of the
empirical mean
1
N
∑N
i=1 Exi. Such assumption was im-
posed in [4] (see Assumption H3 in [4]). We do not have
these assumptions in our paper, since we directly derive
mean-field equations for a finite population of agents.
4 Connection to Social Welfare Optimization
This section focuses on the connection between the
mean-field game (3) and the social welfare optimization
problem. Such connection is typically referred to as “ef-
ficiency”: we say that the mean-field equilibrium is effi-
cient if it maximizes the social welfare. In the literature,
some attempts have been made to draw connections
between the mean-field game and the social welfare op-
timization problem. Most of these works consider the
social welfare optimization problem to be maximizing
the total utility (or equivalently, minimizing the total
cost) of all agents, which in our context can be formu-
lated as follows:
min
(u1,...,uN )
N∑
i=1
E (Vi(xi, ui) + F (x¯) · xi +G(x¯)) (28)
s.t. xi = fi(ui, pii), ui ∈ U¯i, ∀i ∈ N . (29)
where N = {1, . . . , N}. Since the cost function (28) rep-
resents the total cost of the entire population, from the
efficiency point of view, it is desirable to have the mean-
field equilibrium to be the optimal solution to (28). How-
ever, it is shown that this statement is not true in gen-
eral [4], [29], [30]. Therefore, many existing works along
this line focused on characterizing the gap between the
mean-field equilibrium and the optimal solution to (28).
Different from these works, we construct a modified so-
cial welfare optimization problem so that the mean-field
equilibrium achieves exact social optima. This can be
done by introducing a virtual agent in the system with
a cost function φ : X → R, and consider the following
social welfare optimization problem that includes this
virtual cost:
min
u1,...,uN ,z
E
(
N∑
i=1
Vi(xi, ui) + φ(z)
)
(30)
s.t.
{
z =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Exi,
xi = fi(ui, pii), ui ∈ U¯i, ∀i ∈ N .
(31)
where z is the decision of the virtual agent. Compared
to the classical social welfare optimization problem
(28), the constructed problem has an augmented deci-
sion variable, and introduces an additional constraint
z =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Exi. This constraint is inspired by the
supply-demand model in microeconomics, where the
virtual agent acts as a single supplier, and all other
agents are the demands. This constraint requires that
the supply and the demands are balanced.
In the remainder of the section, we will establish con-
ditions under which we can draw connections between
the mean-field equilibrium and the solution to the social
welfare optimization problem (30). Finding such condi-
tions is useful from at least two perspectives. First, if we
are given a mean-field game, we can construct the social
welfare optimization problem to evaluate the efficiency
of the mean-field equilibrium. Second, if we are given a
social welfare optimization problem (28), then we can
design the mean-field game so as to control the popula-
tion to operate at the socially optimal point.
4.1 Connections under Strong Duality
This subsection shows that the solution to the social wel-
fare optimization problem (30) is a mean-field equilib-
rium to the game (3) if (30) has strong duality.
For this purpose, we first introduce the concept of strong
duality for the social welfare optimization problem (30).
With slight abuse of notation, we drop the dependence
of the objective function of (30) on x, and compactly
denote (30) as follows:
P ∗ = min
u,z
Js(u, z) (32)
s.t.
{
g(u, z) = 0
z ∈ X , ui ∈ U¯i, ∀i = 1, . . . , N, (33)
where P ∗ is the optimal value of the social welfare opti-
mization problem (32), u = (u1, . . . , uN ) is the vector of
control inputs, Js(u, z) = E
(∑N
i=1 Vi(fi(ui, pii), ui) + φ(z)
)
,
and g(u, z) = E
∑N
i=1 fi(ui, pii) − Nz. Using this nota-
tion, the Lagrangian of problem (32) can be defined as
follows:
L(u, z, λ) = Js(u, z) + λ · g(u, z). (34)
where λ ∈ X is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
g(u, z) = 0.
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Remark 4 In a more general setting, the Lagrange mul-
tiplier is in the dual space of X , and the inner product
term in (34) should be replaced with a bounded linear op-
erator evaluated at point g(u, z) [42, Chap. 8]. However,
in our problem, since the state space X is a Hilbert space,
we can select the dual space of X to be itself, and the
bounded linear operator reduces to the inner product on
X . Therefore, the expression (34) relies on the fact that
X is a Hilbert space. When X is not a complete space, the
mean-field equations can not be connected to the social
welfare optimization problem.
Given the Lagrangian (34), we first treat the multiplier
as given and define the mapping D : X → R:
D(λ) = inf
ui∈U¯i,z∈X
L(u, z, λ), (35)
then the dual problem of the social welfare optimization
problem (30) is defined as follows:
D∗ = max
λ∈X
D(λ) (36)
whereD∗ is the optimal value of the dual problem. When
the dual problem (36) admits a solution, and the optimal
value of the dual problem (36) coincides with that of
the primal problem (32), then we say the optimization
problem (30) has strong duality. Formally, we define it
as follows:
Definition 2 The optimization problem (30) has strong
duality if P ∗ = D∗ and there exists λ∗ ∈ X such that
D∗ = D(λ∗).
Note that the definition of strong duality not only re-
quires the duality gap to be zero, but also requires the
dual problem to have a finite solution λ∗. This is slightly
stronger than only requiring zero duality gap between
the primal problem (32) and the dual problem (36). In
general, the existence of a finite multiplier to (36) can
be easily guaranteed under mild constraint qualifications
(e.g., Slater’s condition) [42, Chap. 8]. In our paper, when
we say that the social welfare optimization problem has
strong duality, it indicates the problem already satisfies
certain constraint qualifications so that the solution to
(36) exists.
Under strong duality, we can establish connections be-
tween the mean-field equilibrium and the social welfare
optimization problem. These connections are summa-
rized in the next a few theorems and corollaries, which
are the main results of this paper.
Theorem 2 Let φ : X → R be a Fre´chet differentiable
functional such that ∇φ(z) = NF (z), ∀z ∈ X . As-
sume that the social welfare optimization problem (30)
has strong duality, then any socially optimal solution to
(30) is a mean-field equilibrium to the game (3).
Proof. Since the social welfare optimization (30) has
strong duality, then there exists λ∗ such that P ∗ = D∗ =
D(λ∗). Note that due to weak duality, this indicates that
λ∗ is the optimal solution to the dual problem (36), i.e.,
D∗ = infu1∈U¯1,...,uN∈U¯N ,z∈X L(u, z, λ
∗). Let (u∗, z∗) be
the optimal solution to (30), then (u∗, z∗) satisfies the
constraint z∗ =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Ef(u∗i , pii), and we have the
following inequalities:
D∗ = inf
u1∈U¯1,...,uN∈U¯N ,z∈X
L(u, z, λ∗)
≤ L(u∗, z∗, λ∗) = Js(u∗, z∗) + λ∗ · g(u∗, z∗)
= Js(u
∗, z∗) = P ∗. (37)
Due to strong duality, P ∗ = D∗. Therefore, equality
holds in (37), indicating that (u∗, z∗) satisfies the follow-
ing:
(u∗, z∗) ∈ arg min
u1∈U¯1,...,uN∈U¯N ,z∈X
L(u, z, λ∗). (38)
Since L can be decomposed in terms of ui and z, the
relation (38) is equivalent to the following:

u∗i ∈ arg min
ui∈U¯i
E (Vi(fi(ui, pii), ui) + λ∗ · fi(ui, pii))(39)
z∗ ∈ arg min
z∈X
φ(z)−Nλ∗ · z (40)
The first-order optimality condition of (40) yields
∇φ(z∗) = Nλ∗. Since ∇φ(z) = NF (z), we have
F (z∗) = λ∗. Therefore, the above equation sets can be
reduced to the following:

u∗i ∈ arg min
ui∈U¯i
E (Vi(fi(ui, pii), ui) + λ∗ · fi(ui, pii))(41)
λ∗ = F
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Efi(u∗i , pii)
)
(42)
It can be verified that (41)-(42) is equivalent to the
mean-field equations (16)-(18). Therefore, (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N )
is a mean-field equilibrium. This completes the proof.
Theorem 2 shows that any socially optimal solution is
a mean-field equilibrium if ∇φ(z) = NF (z). This indi-
cates that we can construct φ(·) from F (·) to study the
mean-field equilibrium. Checking the existence of φ(·)
and computing φ(·) from F (·) are non-trivial for an ar-
bitrary F (·) in general vector spaces. However, since the
majority of the literature formulates the cost function as
an integral over time [4], [25], F (·) typically has special
structures: it represents a trajectory over time, and its
value at each time t only depends on x(t). In this case,
we can easily derive φ(·) using variational analysis. An
example is given in Section VI-B.
Theorem 2 only shows that any socially optimal solution
is the mean-field equilibrium. This does not necessarily
mean that any mean-field equilibrium is also socially op-
timal. However, the other direction of the relation also
holds when the mean-field equations have a unique solu-
tion. This can be summarized in the following corollary:
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Corollary 1 Let φ : X → R be a Fre´chet differentiable
functional such that ∇φ(z) = NF (z), ∀z ∈ X . As-
sume that the social welfare optimization problem (30)
has strong duality, and the mean-field game (30) has a
unique mean-field equilibrium, then the mean-field equi-
librium to (3) is the globally optimal solution to the social
welfare optimization problem (30).
The proof of the corollary follows easily from Theorem
2, and is therefore omitted. Corollary 1 can be used to
check the efficiency of the mean-field equilibrium when
the mean-field equations admit at most one solution.
4.2 Special Case with Monotone Mean-Field Coupling
In general, the mean-field equations may admit multi-
ple solutions. According to Theorem 2, the best mean-
field equilibrium among these solutions is the optimal
solution to the social welfare optimization problem, but
there may exist other mean-field equilibria that are not
socially optimal. In this subsection, we show that this
complication can be resolved if the following monotonic-
ity condition is imposed on the mean-field coupling term
F (·):
Definition 3 (monotone mean-field coupling)
The mean-field coupling term F (x) is monotone with
respect to x ∈ X , if (F (x)−F (x′)) · (x− x′) ≥ 0 for any
x, x′ ∈ X .
Under this condition, φ(·) is convex, and we can derive a
stronger result than Theorem 2, where the relation be-
tween the mean-field equilibrium and the socially opti-
mal solutions can go either way:
Theorem 3 Let φ : X → R be a Fre´chet differentiable
functional such that ∇φ(z) = NF (z), ∀z ∈ X . As-
sume that the social welfare optimization problem (30)
has strong duality, and assume that F (·) is monotone,
then (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N ) is the mean-field equilibrium to (30) if
and only if it is the globally optimal solution to the social
welfare optimization problem (30).
Proof. Based on Theorem 2, the socially optimal so-
lution is a mean-field equilibrium. Therefore, it suf-
fices to show the other direction also holds. For no-
tational convenience, let u¯ = (u¯1, . . . , u¯N ) be the so-
lution to the mean-field equations (16)-(18). Define
z¯ =
1
N
E
∑N
i=1 fi(u¯i, pii), and let y¯ = F (z¯). Since
F (z) =
1
N
∇φ(z), we have ∇φ(z¯) = Ny¯. Since F (z)
is monotone, φ(z) is convex. Therefore, ∇φ(z¯) = Ny¯
indicates that:
z¯ ∈ arg min
z∈X
φ(z)−Ny¯ · z. (43)
Due to (16), we also have:
u¯i ∈ arg min
ui∈U¯i
E (Vi(fi(ui, pii), ui) + y¯ · fi(ui, pii)) . (44)
The above two equations together indicate that (u¯, z¯) is
the optimal solution to the following optimization prob-
lem:
min
u,z
N∑
i=1
EVi(xi, ui) + φ(z) + y¯ · (
N∑
i=1
Exi −Nz) (45)
s.t.
{
xi = fi(ui, pii)
ui ∈ U¯i, z ∈ X . (46)
In other words, (u¯, z¯) satisfies:
(u¯, z¯) ∈ arg min
u1∈U¯1,...,uN∈U¯N ,z∈X
L(u, z, y¯). (47)
Note that due to weak duality, we have:
L(u¯, z¯, y¯) ≤ D∗ ≤ P ∗. (48)
On the other hand, we also have:
L(u¯, z¯, y¯) = Js(u¯, z¯) + y¯ · g(u¯, z¯)
= Js(u¯, z¯) ≥ P ∗, (49)
where the last inequality is due to the fact that P ∗
is the minimum value of Js(u, z) among all (u, z) such
that z =
1
N
E
∑N
i=1 fi(ui, pii), and (u¯, z¯) is one of them.
Combing (48) and (49), we have L(u¯, z¯, y¯) = P ∗, thus
(u¯, z¯) is the globally optimal solution to the social welfare
optimization problem (30). This completes the proof.
This theorem establishes equivalence between the mean-
field equilibrium and the socially optimal solutions.
When the mean-field term is monotone, the solution
set of the mean-field equations is the same as that of
the social welfare optimization problem as long as (30)
has strong duality. Regarding this result, an interesting
special case is where the social welfare optimization
problem is convex. To ensure convexity, we introduce
the following conditions:
Assumption 5 (i) fi(ui, pii) is affine with respect to ui,
∀pii ∈ Π, (ii) Vi(xi, ui) is convex with respect to (xi, ui),
(iii) Xi and Ui are convex, (iv) F (·) is monotone.
It can be easily verified that the social welfare optimiza-
tion problem is convex with respect to (x1, . . . , xN , z)
under Assumption 5. In this case, the social welfare op-
timization problem has strong duality under mild con-
straint qualifications. Therefore, we have the following
corollary:
Corollary 2 Let φ : X → R be a Fre´chet differentiable
functional such that ∇φ(z) = NF (z), ∀z ∈ X . Under
Assumption 5, (u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N ) is the mean-field equilibrium
to (3) if and only if it is the globally optimal solution to
the social welfare optimization problem (30).
This corollary can be easily proved based on Theo-
rem 3: Assumption 5 guarantees that the social welfare
optimization problem (30) is convex with respect to
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(x1, . . . , xN , z). Therefore, based on duality theory [42,
p. 224], the social welfare optimization problem (30) has
strong duality. Furthermore, according to Theorem 3,
the solution set of the mean-field equations is the same
as that of the social welfare optimization problem.
In the more general case, Assumption 5 may not be sat-
isfied, and the social welfare optimization problem may
be non-convex with respect to (x1, . . . , xN , z). There-
fore, to apply the result of the theorems, we need to
check whether the social welfare optimization problem
has strong duality, especially when Assumption 5 is not
satisfied. Along this direction, many sufficient conditions
have been developed to check the strong duality for non-
convex optimization [43], [44], [45]. Due to space limit,
we will not present the technical details of these works.
Instead, we will provide an example in Section VI, where
the social welfare optimization problem does not satisfy
Assumption 5, but Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 can still
be applied.
Remark 5 In this paper, we formulate the mean-field
term F (·) to depend on the average of the population
state. However, the proposed method still works when
the mean-field is the average of the control decisions. In
this case, the individual cost functional (2) is defined as
Ji(xi, ui, F (m), G(m)) = Vi(xi, ui) + F
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui
)
·
ui+G
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui
)
. Similar result can be obtained using
the same approach.
4.3 Relation to Potential Games
The proposed social welfare optimization is different
from the potential function in potential games. This
subsection discusses their differences.
First, we show that in general, the mean-field game (3)
is not a potential game, thus (30) is not a potential func-
tion. To construct a counter-example, consider a group
of agents with the following cost function:
Ji(x1, · · · , xN ) = (xi − 1)2 + xilogx¯, (50)
Note that on the one hand, it is easy to verify that (50)
satisfies Assumption 5. Therefore, based on Theorem 3,
the mean-field equilibrium is equivalent to the modified
social welfare optimization problem (30). On the other
hand, based on Theorem 4.5 in [46], (50) is a potential
game if and only if:
∂2Ji
∂xi∂xj
=
∂2Jj
∂xi∂xj
. (51)
It can be verified that (51) does not hold for (50). There-
fore, it is not a potential game.
Second, under additional assumptions (i.e., F (x¯) =
c
∑N
i=1 xi), the mean-field game may reduce to a poten-
tial game. In this case, we can either solve the potential
function minimization or the social welfare optimization
problem to derive the mean-field equilibrium. However,
the solutions to these two methods are different: the
potential function method provides a Nash equilibrium
of the game, while the social welfare optimization leads
to the -Nash equilibrium. This is a relaxed solution
concept. On the other hand, from the computational
perspective, it is more attractive to use the social wel-
fare optimization instead of the potential function. This
is because the computational complexity of solving the
potential minimization problem increases as the number
of agents increases, while the social welfare optimization
enables a decentralized scheme where the computation
time is irrelevant with respect to the number of agents
in the game [23]. This property is important in large-
scale game problems. More details on the computation
of mean-field equilibria can be found in the next section.
5 Implication on Existence, Uniqueness and
Computation
Our results have some interesting implications on the ex-
istence, uniqueness and computation of the mean-field
equilibrium. These implications extend the results in the
literature to more general cases. We discuss these impli-
cations in this section.
5.1 Existence of the Mean-Field Equilibrium
The existence and uniqueness of the mean-field equilib-
rium is a problem of fundamental importance in mean-
field games. This problem has been extensively studied
in the literature [1], [8], [32], [33], [47], and many of these
works are based on fixed point analysis. In this section,
we provide a novel approach inspired by the connection
between the mean-field game and the social welfare op-
timization problem. Our approach extends existing re-
sults to more general cases. We start with the following
result:
Proposition 1 There exists a mean-field equilibrium to
(3) if the social welfare optimization problem (30) has
strong duality, where φ(·) is such that ∇φ(z) = NF (z),
∀z ∈ X .
The proof directly follows from Theorem 2: since the
optimal solution to (30) is a mean-field equilibrium, if
(30) admits a solution, then the mean-field equations also
admit a solution. An interesting fact about Theorem 1
is that it draws connections between the existence of the
mean-field equilibrium and the strong duality of (30).
This enables us to check the existence of the mean-field
equilibrium by verifying the strong duality of (30).
Proposition 1 provides a sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of the mean-field equilibrium. In fact, we can show
that this condition is also necessary under additional as-
sumptions on the mean-field coupling term F (·). This is
summarized in the following theorem:
Proposition 2 Assume that F (·) is monotone, then
there exists a mean-field equilibrium to the game (3) if and
only if the social welfare optimization problem (30) has
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strong duality, where φ(·) is such that ∇φ(z) = NF (z),
∀z ∈ X .
The proof is a byproduct of the proof of Theorem 3,
which directly follows from (48) and (49). We comment
that most related results in existing works only have suf-
ficient conditions for the existence of the mean-field equi-
librium [1], [8], [32], [33], [47]. In view of this, the signifi-
cance of Theorem 2 is that it provides an existence con-
dition that is both necessary and sufficient. Using this
result, we can not only show that the mean-field equi-
librium exists under strong duality, but also show that
the mean-field equilibrium does not exist when strong
duality does not hold.
5.2 Uniqueness of the Mean-Field Equilibrium
We has the following result on the uniqueness of the
mean-field equilibrium:
Proposition 3 There is a unique mean-field equilibrium
to the game (3) if the social welfare optimization prob-
lem (30) is strictly convex with respect to (u1, . . . , uN , z),
where φ(·) is such that ∇φ(z) = NF (z), ∀z ∈ X .
The proof follows from Corollary 2: under the assump-
tions, the solution set to the mean-field equations is
equivalent to that of the social welfare optimization
problem. As (30) is strictly convex, it has a unique so-
lution. Therefore, the mean-field equations also have a
unique solution.
Proposition 3 has interesting connections to many exist-
ing works on the uniqueness of the mean-field equilib-
rium. Although most of these works focus on continuum
mass model, if we consider the finite counterpart of these
works and adapt their models to our context, then we
can roughly divide the conditions in these works in three
categories. First, the cost function Vi(f(ui, pii), ui) is as-
sumed to be strictly convex with respect to ui, and the
coupling term F (·) is monotone [8], [32], [33]. Second,
the cost function Vi(f(ui, pii), ui) is convex with respect
to ui, and the coupling term F (·) is strictly increasing
[17], [47]. Third, the cost function is at least convex, and
the coupling term is at least monotone, but either one
of them holds strictly [1]. We note that these conditions
can be all recovered by Theorem 3: it is not hard to ver-
ify that all these conditions essentially ensure the social
welfare optimization problem (30) to be strictly convex
with respect to (u1, . . . , uN , z). According to Theorem
3, there is a unique mean filed equilibrium for the mean-
field game. Therefore, Theorem 3 connects the unique-
ness of the mean-field equilibrium to the strict convexity
of an optimization problem, providing a novel interpre-
tation of these existing results.
To summarize, we have established the connections be-
tween the mean-field equilibrium and the social welfare
optimization problem, and discussed the implications on
the existence and uniqueness of the mean-field equilib-
rium. To better understand these results, we graphically
summarize these connections using a diagram in Fig-
ure 1. In this figure, S.O. stands for the socially optima
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Figure 1. The pictorial summary of our results, where S.O.
stands for socially optimal solutions, and MFE stands for
mean-field equilibrium.
solution to (30), MFE stands for the mean-field equilib-
rium, the arrow indicates the conclusion we can draw,
and the text on the arrow denotes the conditions for the
conclusion.
5.3 Computation of the Mean-Field Equilibrium
Aside from existence and uniqueness, another important
implication of our result is on the computation of the
mean-field equilibrium. Since the mean-field game can
be connected to the social welfare optimization problem
(30), we can compute the mean-field equilibrium by solv-
ing the corresponding social welfare optimization prob-
lem. When problem (30) is convex, there are many effi-
cient algorithms to compute its solutions. In this subsec-
tion, we will present a primal-dual algorithm [42, Chap.
10] to compute the mean-field equilibrium, and we will
show that many algorithms in the literature for com-
puting the mean-field equilibrium are equivalent to the
primal-dual algorithm for solving the corresponding so-
cial welfare optimization problem.
We consider a mean-field game (3) that satisfies Assump-
tion 5. According to Corollary 2, to compute the mean-
field equilibrium, we can construct the corresponding
social welfare optimization problem and solve it using
a primal-dual algorithm. The details of the algorithm
is summarized in Algorithm 1. To implement the algo-
rithm, we first construct the social welfare optimization
problem (30) by finding the virtual cost φ. After this,
an initial guess for the Lagrangian multiplier λ is broad-
cast to all the agents. Each agent can then independently
solve the convex optimization problem (52), while the
virtual supplier solves the optimization problem (53) for
a given λ. The solutions of the cost minimization prob-
lems are collected and used to update the dual λ accord-
ing to (54). The updated dual variable is then broadcast
to the agents again and this procedure is iterated until
it converges. Based on [42, Chap. 10] and Corollary 2,
it is easy to prove that the algorithm converges to the
mean-field equilibrium of (3).
Proposition 4 Algorithm 1 converges to the mean-
field equilibrium of (3) if Assumption 5 is satisfied
and the step-size ιk satisfies limk→∞ ιk = 0 and
limk→∞
∑k
m=1 ιm =∞.
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Algorithm 1 The Primal-Dual Algorithm to Compute
the Mean-Field Equilibrium
Initialization: the mean-field game (3),
1: Construct (30) by finding φ(·) that ∇φ(·) = NF (·),
2: Generate initial guess for the Lagrange Multiple, λ0,
3: for k = 1, 2, . . . , do
4: Update the individual decisions by solving:
uki = arg min
ui∈U¯i
E
(
Vi(fi(ui, pii), ui) + λ
k−1 · fi(ui, pii)
)
(52)
5: Update the virtual supplier decision:
zk−1 = arg min
z∈X
φ(z)−Nλk−1 · z, (53)
6: Update the dual variable according to:
λk = λk−1 + ιk
(
1
N
Efi(uki , pii)− zk−1
)
, (54)
7: end for
Output: the collective decisions (u1, . . . , uN ).
It can be verified that the proposed algorithm includes
many existing ways to compute the mean-field equilib-
rium as special cases. For instance, the algorithms pro-
posed in [9] and [23] are equivalent to the primal-dual
algorithm with a scaled stepsize in (54). Specifically, a
finite-horizon deterministic linear quadratic mean-field
game was considered in [9], and an iterative algorithm
was proposed to compute its mean-field equilibrium. The
first step of the algorithm solves the same optimal re-
sponse problem as (52), and the second step updates z
according to:
zk = zk−1 + νk
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi(u
k
i )− zk−1
)
, (55)
where νk is the step size. We comment that this is a scaled
version of the Algorithm 1. This is because in the linear
quadratic game, φ(·) is a quadratic function, and (53)
indicates that there is a positive definite matrix B such
that Bzk = λk for all k. Therefore, the update equation
(54) in Algorithm 1 can be written as:
zk = zk−1 +B−1ιk
(
1
N
Efi(uki , pii)− zk−1
)
,
which is equivalent to (55) with B−1ιk = νk.
6 Case Studies
This section presents two examples to show how our re-
sults can be used to study the properties of the mean-field
equilibrium. The first example is a special case where the
mean-field coupling term F (·) is monotone. In this case,
we can show that the mean-field equilibrium is equiva-
lent to socially optimal solution if the social welfare opti-
mization problem has strong duality. The second exam-
ple presents a more general case where the monotonicity
condition is not satisfied. In this case, we can still draw
connections between the mean-field equilibrium and the
social welfare optimization problem using the result of
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.
6.1 Example: Special Case with Monotone Mean-Field
Coupling
The first example considers the problem of coordinating
the charging of a population of electric vehicles (EV) [9].
Each EV is modeled as a linear dynamic system, and the
objective is to acquire a charge amount within a finite
horizon while minimizing the charging cost. The charg-
ing cost of each EV is coupled through the electricity
price, which is an affine function of the average of charg-
ing energy. This leads to the following game problem [9]:
min
ui
η||ui − z||2 + 2γ(z + c)Tui (56)
subject to:
z =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui,
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ui(t),
0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ x¯i, 0 ≤ ui(t) ≤ u¯i,
∑T
t=1 ui(t) = γi,
where 0 < η  γ, xi(t) ∈ R is the state of charge (scaled
by the capacity) of the EV battery, ui(t) denotes the
charging energy during the tth control period, x¯i is the
battery capacity, and the electricity price is 2γ(z + c).
In this mean-field game, the coupling term F (z) = 2(γ−
η)z is increasing with respect to z, thus the monotonicity
condition is satisfied. We also note that (56) is slightly
different from (3) in the sense that the coupling term
depends on the average of control instead of the state.
However, based on Remark 5, there is no essential dif-
ference between these two formulations, and our result
applies universally.
The focus of this case study is to investigate the effi-
ciency, existence, uniqueness, and computation of the
mean-field equilibrium to (56). To this end, we first con-
struct the social welfare optimization problem for (56)
by finding the function φ(·) such that F (z) = 1
N
∇φ(z).
Since F (z) = 2(γ − η)z, we have φ(z) = N(γ − η)zT z.
This indicates that the social welfare optimization prob-
lem for (56) is as follows:
min
(u1,...,uN ,z)
N∑
i=1
(
η||ui||2 + 2γcTui
)
+N(γ − η)zT z
(57)
subject to:
z =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ui(t), ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K
0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ x¯i, 0 ≤ ui(t) ≤ u¯i,
∑T
t=1 ui(t) = γi, .
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the population in two algorithms.
where I = {1, . . . , N} and K = {1, . . . ,K}. It can be
verified that the game problem (56) satisfies Assump-
tion 5. According to Corollary 2, the control decision
(u1, . . . , uN ) is a mean-field equilibrium for (56) if and
only if it is an optimal solution to (57). In addition, since
(57) is strictly convex with respect to (u1, . . . , uN , z),
based on Theorem 3, the mean-field equilibrium exists
and is unique.
Next, we study the computation of the mean-field equi-
librium to (56). In [9], the mean-field equilibrium of (56)
is computed by an iterative algorithm. In the algorithm,
each agent takes z as given and solve the problem (56)
to obtain an optimal control ui. Based on ui, z is up-
dated according to (55). Each agent then takes z′ as
given to repeat the first step. This algorithm converges
to the mean-field equilibrium of (56) if limk→∞ νk = 0
and limk→∞
∑k
m=1 νm = ∞. Under this choice of step-
size, the algorithm is referred to as the Mann iteration,
and we will use it as the benchmark
In this paper, we propose to compute the mean-field equi-
librium using the connections between the mean-field
game and the social welfare optimization problem. Based
on Corollary 2, the mean-field equilibrium can be com-
puted by solving the convex problem (57). This problem
can be efficiently solved by alternating direction method
of multipliers (ADMM) [34]. In the rest of this subsec-
tion, we will use numerical simulation to compare the
performance of the proposed ADMM algorithm with the
benchmark algorithm (Mann iteration).
In the numerical simulation, we generate 100 sets of
EV parameters over 36 control periods, and each period
spans 5 minutes. The heterogeneous parameters, includ-
ing the capacity of the EV batteries, the maximum charg-
ing rate of the batteries, and the other parameters in the
objective function are all generated based on uniform
distributions. We run both Mann iterations and ADMM
for 200 iterations, and the simulation results are shown
in Fig. 2 - Fig. 4. In Fig. 2, we randomly select an EV and
show its trajectory of state of charge under the ADMM
solution. To compare the performance between ADMM
and the Mann iteration, we show ||ui|| for a randomly se-
lected EV (Fig. 3) and the average control decision ||z||
(Fig. 4) over each iteration. Based on the simulation re-
sults, the ADMM algorithm convergences to the optimal
solution after about 50 iterations, while the Mann iter-
ation converges after 100 iterations. Therefore, the pro-
posed ADMM converges faster than Mann iteration. We
emphasize that the algorithm converges only if both z
and ui converge. In Fig. 4, it seems that the Mann itera-
tion converges faster than ADMM. As a matter of fact,
although ||z|| converges fairly fast, z does not converge
until after 100 iterations. This has been verified in the
codes.
6.2 Example: Non-Monotone Mean-Field Coupling
The second example presents a general case where the
mean-field coupling term is not monotone. In the rest of
this subsection, we show how to use the result of Theo-
rem 2 and Corollary 1 to draw connections between the
mean-field equilibrium and the social welfare optimiza-
tion problem.
Consider a game with N agents. Each agent i wants to
minimize the following objective function:
min
xi
||xi||2 + κ
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+1)txi(t)sin
(
x¯(t)
)
dt, (58)
where xi takes value in the Hilbert space X =
{x| ∫
[0,∞) e
−ρt|x(t)|2dt <∞}with the inner product (9),
x¯(t) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t), and ρ and κ are positive scalars.
In this example, the system dynamics are xi = ui, and
the mean-field coupling term is F (x¯) = {Ft(x¯), t ≥ 0},
where Ft(x¯) = κe
−tsin
(
x¯(t)
)
. It is clear that the mono-
tonicity condition does not hold.
Next, we will construct the corresponding social welfare
optimization problem for (58). To this end, consider a
virtual supply cost that satisfies ∇φ(z) = NF (z):
φ(z) = −Nκ
∫ ∞
0
e−tcos
(
z(t)
)
dt, (59)
This gives rise to the following social welfare optimiza-
tion problem:
min
x1,...,xN ,z
N∑
i=1
||xi||2 −Nκ
∫ ∞
0
e−tcos
(
z(t)
)
dt (60)
s.t.
{
z =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi;
xi = X , z ∈ X , ∀i = 1, . . . , N.
(61)
The above problem is non-convex with respect to
(x1, . . . , xN , z), but we can still show that the primal
problem social (60) has the same optimal value as its
dual problem.
Lemma 4 The social welfare optimization problem (60)
has strong duality.
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Proof. To prove strong duality, according to Definition
2, it suffices to show that there exists λ∗ such that P ∗ =
D∗ = D(λ∗). To show this, we first note that since κ > 0,
the cost function of primal problem (60) is lower bounded
by −Nκ:
N∑
i=1
||xi||2 −Nκ
∫ ∞
0
e−tcos
(
z(t)
)
dt ≥ −Nκ.
It can be verified that when xi = 0 and z = 0, the
cost function of (60) equals −Nκ and the constraints are
satisfied. Therefore, −Nκ is the optimal value for the
primal problem. According to Definition 2, it suffices to
find λ∗ such that the minimum value of L(u, z, λ∗) is also
−Nκ. Let λ∗ = 0, then the Lagrangian dual L(u, z, 0)
corresponds to the following problem:
min
x1,...,xN ,z
N∑
i=1
||xi||2 −Nκ
∫ ∞
0
e−tcos
(
z(t)
)
dt (62)
s.t.: xi = R, z ∈ R, ∀i = 1, . . . , N.
The optimal value of (62) is clearly −Nκ. Therefore,
strong duality holds.
Based on Theorem 2, if the social welfare optimization
problem (60) has strong duality, then any solution to
(60) is a mean-field equilibrium.
We note that this relation only holds from one direction:
there may exist a mean-field equilibrium which is not
socially optimal. In section IV, we showed that this can
be resolved when the mean-field equilibrium is unique.
In our example, we can show that this is true under some
conditions:
Lemma 5 If 0 < κ < 2, then the mean-field equations
for (58) admit a unique solution.
Proof. To prove the uniqueness, the idea is to construct
a contraction mapping, whose fixed point is the solution
to the mean-field equations. In particular, we first regard
z as given and solve the problem (58) to derive the op-
timal solution as x∗i (t) = −
1
2
κsin
(
x¯(t)
)
. Then we define
a function T : X → X that maps x¯ to the average of
x∗i : T (x¯) = {Tt(x¯), t ≥ 0}, and Tt(x¯) = −
1
2
κsin
(
x¯(t)
)
.
It can be verified that the mean-field equilibrium is the
fixed point of this mapping.
Since |sin(x) − sin(y)| ≤ |x − y| for x, y ∈ R, we have
||T (m1) − T (m2)|| ≤ 1
2
κ||m1 − m2|| for any m1 ∈ X
and m2 ∈ X . Therefore, as κ < 2, T (x¯) is a contraction
mapping, and it has a unique fixed point. This completes
the proof.
Based on Corollary 1 and Lemma 5, it is clear that the
mean-field equilibrium to (58) is socially optimal when
0 < κ < 2.
To summarize, the connection between the mean-field
equilibrium to (58) and the social welfare optimization
problem is as follows:
Proposition 5 If κ > 0, the any socially optimal solu-
tion of (60) is a mean-field equilibrium to (58). In ad-
dition, if 0 < κ < 2, then the mean-field equilibrium to
(58) is the globally optimal solution to the social welfare
optimization problem (60).
The proof follows from Lemma 4, Lemma 5, Theorem 2
and Corollary 1.
7 conclusion
This paper studies the connections between a class of
mean-field games and the social welfare optimization
problem. We showed that the mean-field equilibrium is
the optimal solution to a social welfare optimization
problem, and this holds for both convex and non-convex
individual cost functions and action spaces. The result
enables us to evaluate and promote the efficiency of
the mean-field equilibria, and it also provides interest-
ing implication on the existence, uniqueness and compu-
tation of the mean-field equilibrium. Numerical simula-
tions are presented to validate the proposed approach.
Future work includes extending the proposed approach
to the case of infinitely many agents and more general
formulations where the mean-field term depends on the
probability distribution of the population state.
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Appendix
A: Proof of Lemma 1
It is well-known that based on the Riesz-Fischer theorem
[48, p.148], the L2 space is complete. We show that X is
isomorphic to L2, and therefore it is also complete [49,
p.20]. For this purpose, we define the following mapping:
g : L2 → X that satisfies g(·) = {gt(·), t ≥ 0} and
gt(l(t)) = e
ρt/2l(t) for any l ∈ L2, where l = {l(t), t ≥ 0}.
This is a linear surjective mapping and it can be verified
that g(l1(t)) · g(l2(t)) = l1(t) · l2(t), where the left-hand
side inner product is defined as (9) on X and the right-
hand side inner product is defined on the L2 space in
the canonical form. This indicates that L2 and X are
isomorphic, which completes the proof.
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B: Proof of Lemma 2
To prove this result, it is clear that we have:∣∣E(F (x¯) · xi)−F (Ex¯) · Exi∣∣ = ∣∣I1 + I2∣∣ ≤∣∣I1∣∣+ ∣∣I2∣∣,
where we define I1 as I1 = E
(
F (x¯) · xi
) − EF (x¯) · Exi
and I2 = EF (x¯) · Exi − F (Ex¯) · Exi. Then it suffices to
show that both
∣∣I1∣∣ and ∣∣I2∣∣ converge to 0 at the rate of
1√
N
. To show this, we first note that:
∣∣I1∣∣ = ∣∣E(F (x¯) · xi)−EF (x¯) · Exi∣∣ = ∣∣I3 + I4∣∣ ≤∣∣I3∣∣+ ∣∣I4∣∣,
where we define I3 = E
(
F (x¯) ·xi
)−E(F (x¯−i) ·xi), I4 =
E
(
F (x¯−i) · xi
) − E(F (x¯) · Exi) and x¯−i = 1
N
∑
j 6=i xj .
Since F (·) is Lipschitz continuous with the constant L ≥
0, and the second moment of xi is bounded, we have:∣∣I3∣∣ = ∣∣E(F (x¯) · xi)− E(F (x¯−i) · xi)∣∣ ≤
E
∣∣F (x¯) · xi − F (x¯−i) · xi∣∣ ≤ E(∥∥ L
N
xi
∥∥∥∥xi∥∥) =
L
N
E||xi||2 ≤ LC
N
.
In addition, as xi is uncorrelated with x¯−i, we have∣∣I4∣∣ = ∣∣E(F (x¯−i) · xi)− E(F (x¯) · Exi)∣∣ =∣∣EF (x¯−i) · Exi − EF (x¯) · Exi∣∣ ≤ L
N
∥∥Exi∥∥2.
Note that E||xi||2 is bounded, and thus
∥∥Exi∥∥ is also
bounded:∥∥Exi∥∥ ≤ E∥∥xi∥∥ = √E∥∥xi∥∥2 − E (∥∥xi∥∥− E∥∥xi∥∥)2
≤
√
E
∥∥xi∥∥2 ≤ √C. (63)
This indicates that
∣∣I4∣∣ ≤ LC
N
. Therefore,
∣∣I1∣∣ ≤ ∣∣I3∣∣+∣∣I4∣∣ ≤ 2LC
N
. To show that
∣∣I2∣∣ converges to 0 at the rate
of
1√
N
, we define a random variable rN = F (x¯)−F (Ex¯).
Note that:
I2 ≤
∥∥EF (x¯)− F (Ex¯)∥∥∥∥Exi∥∥ = ∥∥ErN∥∥∥∥Exi∥∥. (64)
Since ||ErN || ≤ E||rN || and ||Exi|| ≤
√
C, the inequality
(64) reduces to I2 ≤
√
CE||rN ||. Therefore, for our pur-
pose, it suffices to show that E||rN || = O( 1√
N
). Since
F (·) is Lipschitz continuous, we have:
||rN || = ||F (x¯)− F (Ex¯)|| ≤ L||x¯− Ex¯||.
Therefore, it suffices to show that E||x¯−Ex¯|| = O( 1√
N
).
To prove this, we note that since xi and xj are uncorre-
lated, thus we have the following relation:
E||x¯− Ex¯||2 = 1
N2
E
N∑
i=1
||xi − Exi||2 <
1
N2
E
N∑
i=1
||xi||2 ≤ NC
N2
=
C
N
.
Therefore, similar to (63), we have
E||x¯− Ex¯|| ≤
√
E||x¯− Ex¯||2 ≤
√
C
N
.
This completes the proof.
C: Proof of Lemma 3
Since ∇G(·) is Lipschitz continuous with constant β, for
any x, y ∈ X , we have:
|G(x)−G(y)| ≤ ∇G(y) · (x− y) + β
2
||x− y||2. (65)
Based on (65), the following relation holds:
E|G(x¯)−G(x¯−i)| ≤ E
(
∇G(x¯) · −xi
N
)
+
β
2
E||xi
N
||2
≤ E
(
||∇G(x¯)||||xi
N
||
)
+
β
2N2
E||xi||2.
(66)
Since derivative ofG(·) is Lipschitz continuous with con-
stant β, we have ||∇G(x¯)|| ≤ ||∇G(0)||+β||x¯||. Plugging
this in (66), we obtain:
E|G(x¯)−G(x¯−i)| ≤||∇G(0)||
N
E||xi||+ β
N
E (||x¯||||xi||)
+
β
2N2
E||xi||2
The right-hand side of the above inequality consists of
three terms. We will show that all the three terms con-
verge to 0 at the rate of 1/N . For notation convenience,
let the three terms be TN1 =
||∇G(0)||
N
E||xi||, TN2 =
β
N
E (||x¯||||xi||) and TN3 =
β
2N2
E||xi||2. In the proof of
Lemma 2, we showed that that E||xi|| ≤
√
C. There-
fore, we have TN1 <
√
C||∇G(0)||
N
. Due to Assumption
3, ||∇G(0)|| is bounded, thus TN1 = O(
1
N
). As for the
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second term, we have:
TN2 =
β
N
E (||x¯||||xi||) = β
N2
E
 N∑
j=1
||xj ||||xi||

=
β
N2
E||xi||2 +∑
j 6=i
E(||xi||||xj ||)

=
β
N2
E||xi||2 +∑
j 6=i
E||xi||E||xj ||
 ≤ βC
N
Furthermore, since E||xi||2 ≤ C, we have TN3 =
β
2N2
E||xi||2 ≤ βC
2N2
, thus TN1 + T
N
2 + T
N
3 = O(
1
N
).
This completes the proof.
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